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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we present our experiences with the cleaning of Web 
client and proxy usage logs, based on a long-term browsing study 
with 25 participants. A detailed clickstream log, recorded using a 
Web intermediary, was combined with a second log of user inter-
face actions, which was captured by a modified Firefox browser 
for a subset of the participants. The consolidated data from both 
records revealed many page requests that were not directly related 
to user actions. For participants who had no ad-filtering system 
installed, these artifacts made up one third of all transferred Web 
pages. Three major reasons could be identified: HTML Frames 
and iFrames, advertisements, and automatic page reloads. The 
experiences made during the data cleaning process might help 
other researchers to choose adequate filtering methods for their 
data. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.5.4 Hypertext/Hypermedia: User issues.  
General Terms 
Experimentation, Human Factors 
Keywords 
Clickstream study, proxy log analysis, data cleaning 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Winter 2004/2005, we conducted a long-term Web usage study 
with 25 participants from Germany and the Netherlands. The 
logging environment for the study consisted of two comple-
menting tools: all participants made use of an intermediary system 
[1] filtering all http traffic. The system added JavaScript events 
and processing functions to every Web page. This code ‘instru-
mented’ the Web pages to record user clicks, form entries and 
various other browser parameters. The data were sent to the inter-
mediary using dedicated http requests1. Our logging tool was 
based on the Scone framework [4; 8] and IBM’s WBI system [5]. 
The result was a rich ‘intermediary log’ with details about every 
selected link anchor, click positions, load and stay times, and all 
submitted form data. The current state of the history of the 
browser window permits identifying backtracking events. More-
over, the system provided unique window and frame names to 
                                                                
1 The image object was used to send http ‘get’ requests to the 
intermediary as soon as specific data had been collected, like 
the completion of a page load or the click on a link. The inter-
mediary returned an empty dummy image, which was not 
displayed. These data transfers were unnoticed by the users. 
Alternatively, the XMLHttpRequest object could have been 
used. 
distinguish the area of page load. The intermediary analyzed all 
transferred documents and recorded descriptive data about their 
contents, size and hyperlink structure.  
In addition, 15 of the 25 participants agreed on using an instru-
mented version of the Firefox 1.0 browser for the time of the 
study. We altered its XUL2 (XML User Interface Language) code 
to record the interaction with its user interface widgets, as well as 
window and tab operations and link clicks. This data listed pre-
cisely all user actions with the browser itself, but missed informa-
tion on the pages visited and the interaction of the participants 
with the documents, like entered form data and click positions.  
Using exact timestamps, the user interface log could be merged 
with the page request log of the intermediary to gain more de-
tailed and accurate data. Due to the experimental setup, we had to 
cope with ten intermediary log streams without browser UI data. 
The first analyses of the recorded data showed that serious data 
preprocessing would be necessary to obtain a ‘clean’ log of navi-
gation actions: many of the page requests recorded by the inter-
mediary were not directly related to user actions. For our purposes 
– analyzing user behavior – these events had to be classified as 
‘artifacts’, as they were not connected with a purposeful action, 
and often not even evident to our participants.  
Although ‘data cleaning’ and ‘ETL’ (Extract, Transform, Load), 
are quite extensively explored fields of data processing, and many 
tools and techniques exist, the specific research area of cleaning 
Web logs seems to be quite unexplored: only few publications 
and no guidelines exist that mention the issues we experienced 
while cleaning the data of our Web client and proxy logs to ex-
tract the desired user actions. 
We identified several categories of page requests that evidently 
were not related to deliberate user actions: HTML Frames, 
iFrames, advertisements and automatic page reloads were the 
main factors; automatic page redirects (using JavaScript or the 
‘redirect’ meta element of HTML) accounted for a less significant 
amount of log entries (see Figure 1). The data in our Web activity 
logs were too extensive for manual data cleaning, so we de-
veloped several heuristics and methods to isolate page loads not 
directly related to intended user actions. 
Based on these heuristics, several Python scripts were imple-
mented that processed all log files into an SQL database and fil-
tered the recorded user actions in three steps: first, most of the 
artifacts that could be identified by URL or by other, more imme-
diate means, were removed; second, the data streams from the 
Web client and proxy logs were combined; finally, the proxy 
                                                                
2 The User interface of Mozilla and Firefox browsers are written 
in XUL, a language based on XML and JavaScript: 
http://www.mozilla.org/projects/xul/ 
  
events that were not matched by client events were postprocessed. 
Several iterations for the development of the algorithms and the 
software were required. 
Data cleaning was a very laborious process, due to the vast num-
ber and the complexity of recorded events: we recorded more than 
160,000 page requests with the intermediaries and nearly 150,000 
user interface actions with Firefox3, and every entry had up to 27 
parameters. It took dozens of hours to sight the data, to develop 
rules how to distinguish ‘real’ user requests from artifacts and to 
verify the results of our data processing tools.  
The following sub-sections address the main methods and heuris-
tics developed during this process. 
1.1 HTML Frames and iFrames 
HTML framesets break the document metaphor: what is visible 
for the user does not originate from a single HTML document and 
many ‘unusable’ events are created as every subframe creates a 
page request to a different HTML file. As an example, a request 
to the (invisdible) top frame of figure 2 would automatically be 
followed by requests for the two sub frames. Together these three 
requests constitute one page view and correspond to one user 
action. Therefore, a merging of these requests seemed to be 
necessary. 
We identified frames by the ‘name’ of the frame (which was ob-
tained from the browser object window.name) and the name of 
the parent frame (window.parent.name). These attributes 
were read by the embedded JavaScript code and transmitted to the 
intermediary.  
However, the interpretation of matching frame events did not only 
require comparing frame and window names, it was also neces-
sary to introduce timeouts, as user actions like link clicks can lead 
to the request of one or more pages within a frameset (for exam-
ple if JavaScript is used). The required timeout for this merging 
process depended on the connection speed of the user. For our 
data set, timeouts between 1.8 seconds (leased line) and 3 seconds 
(isdn) provided the best results. 
                                                                
3 This included also many actions that did not lead to a page 
request, like the selection of browser tabs or closing the browser 
window. 
Nevertheless, one problem remained: frame events are ambigu-
ous, as several URIs are involved in one user action. The de-
cision, which of the page requests is the most relevant, depends 
on the way the data will be interpreted or analyzed. An example 
will clarify the dilemma (see figure 2): if a user selects a link in 
the left navigation frame and a page is loaded in the right content 
frame, the action occurs in the left page but the reaction affects 
the right page with another URI. Each of these three URIs (in-
cluding the parent frame) could be regarded as principal address 
for the user action in the clickstream log.  
The chosen URI mapping affects observed load times [6], the 
visited pages [3; 7], average document sizes as well as the relative 
mouse-cursor position. Therefore, we decided to exclude frame 
pages for some analyses [see 9], like the average load times, the 
revisitation rate and the link click positions (as they were relative 
positions within the documents and not absolute screen positions). 
Another large proportion of non-user-initiated page requests in the 
intermediary log was caused by iFrames (‘Inline Frames’). This 
HTML element allows embedding other Web pages in a specified 
area of a Web document. Every iFrame creates a separate page 
request without any extra user activity. Our participants visited 
many commercial pages that made extensive use of iFrames (e.g. 
eBay and some news sites), which were mainly used to dynami-
cally include advertisements from dedicated servers (see follow-
ing section). We therefore excluded inline frame requests for most 
analyses; this changed some results: e.g. it significantly decreased 
the revisitation rate. 
1.2 Advertisements 
Page requests caused by online advertisement turned out to be 
another significant source of noise. Apart from the mentioned 
iFrames, ads appear quite frequently in (automatic) pop-up win-
dows. Such JavaScript-initiated windows are often not the result 
of a deliberate user action and the offered links were almost never 
followed. Furthermore, most advertisements appeared on Web 
pages with a high popularity and were visited frequently, such as 
popular news and commerce sites. Consequently, the advertise-
ment pages were also revisited; this increased the overall revisita-
tion rate, although the users only intended to revisit the main 
page. 
Furthermore, about two-thirds of our participants had pop-up and 
ad blockers installed. As we wanted to base our calculations on a 
consistent data pool, we decided to exclude these page requests 
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for all users of our study. Consequently, we needed a way to 
identify all automatic page requests related to merchandising. 
Screening the intermediary log data and comparing it with the 
user interface action log, we could validate three techniques for 
identifying ‘pure’ advertisement HTML pages. 
The first method considers the value of the window.name ob-
ject of an iFrame and its main window. Partly names like ‘LVM 
Frame’, ‘merchandizing*’4 or ‘*_ads_frame’ are used 
for advertisement inline frames. In addition, the ad content is fre-
quently requested from a dedicated server with another domain 
name as the main page, and therefore JavaScript access from the 
promotion page to the objects of the parent document is blocked 
by browser security policy. The error message caught by our em-
bedded JavaScript code (PARENT_FRAME_ACCESS_DENIED) 
was thus another indication for such inline frames. However, 
some of these errors were not related to advertisements, as normal 
frames can cause them as well and thus this message mainly 
helped to improve the other heuristics. 
The second technique is based on a list of over 10,000 domain 
names with Web servers that provide only advertisements, like 
ad.doubleclick.com or *.ivwbox.de. This list was 
taken from the SupertrickXG Web site5, a project to register ‘mal-
ware, porn and adware servers’. Although this list is extensive, we 
had to add some additional national advertisement servers, based 
on the prevalence in the Web log files. 
The third method analyses the path and filename in the URI. We 
created a set of regular expressions to identify page loads that are 
caused by pure advertisement pages. These expressions were not 
only based on our manual examination of the log data, but we also 
considered lists of regular expressions, created in conjunction 
with the Mozilla Adblock Project6. Two examples for such 
expressions are:  
[\W\d](ad(banner|click|-?flow|frame|ima?g(es?)?| 
serv(er|e)?|_string|vertisements?|v|vert))[\W\d] 
and  
[\W\d]click(stream|thrutraffic|thru|xchange)[\W\d] 
However, it should be noted that extreme care has to be taken 
when assembling these filters, as overly simple heuristics will in-
correctly identify ‘real’ Web pages as ads. An example is 
www.ad.nl, a popular Dutch news site with a very ‘suspicious’ 
domain name. 
Extensive data auditing verified that these three techniques toge-
ther did identify most unwanted page loads7. For the group of par-
ticipants that did not apply any kind of ad-blocker (8 users) frame 
and advertisement artifacts represented over 28 percent of page 
requests (figure 1), for the remaining users – making use of adver-
tisement and pop-up blockers –, such events were rather marginal 
(below 1%). The proportion of pure advertisement page requests 
seems remarkably high, as it does not consider online promotion 
realized as pure text, embedded images, or flash animations.  
                                                                
4 The asterisk represents a wildcard character. 
5 The ‘Supertrick XG Project’ home page can be found at: 
http://www.filesharingplace.com/supertrickxg/main.htm 
6 The ‘Adblock Project’ is located at http://adblock.mozdev.org/  
7 At the same time these results can be used to improve current 
ad-blocking practice. 
1.3 Automatic Page Reloads 
A third source of non-user-initiated page requests was the auto-
matic reloading of pages. We identified several reasons for Web 
page reloads not initiated by our participants. Either embedded 
JavaScript code like  
window.location.reload(); 
triggered by a timer, or the ‘refresh’ meta-element  
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="2"> 
was often used for this purpose. In other cases, external applica-
tions, like instant messaging agents, were responsible for the arti-
facts. All these methods produce a constant time interval between 
reloads that we used to identify these events.  
The auto reloads became apparent when we analyzed the indi-
vidual page revisitation rate and the page stay time distribution. 
Automatically reloaded pages emerged as frequent revisits to one 
URI in a row with a repetitive stay time. As a result, they 
appeared as peaks in the stay time distribution of certain users 
(see figure 3) and we could identify many of these entries manu-
ally. Furthermore, we implemented an algorithm to detect auto-
matic page reloads: If three more requests to the same URI 
occurred consecutively in the same window and they all had ap-
proximately the same stay time (plus/minus 1 second), these page 
requests were marked as artifacts as well. 
Overall, automatic page reloads contributed nearly four percent of 
the page requests. However, the ratio differed severely between 
individuals: some participants did not visit any periodically reloa-
ded pages, while for others they made up over 20% of all trans-
mitted pages. The relation is influenced by the kind of Web sites 
visited, the applications used and the behavior of the user: by 
leaving a browser window opened in the background of her desk-
top, or by keeping the computer turned on overnight, a significant 
amount of irrelevant events was created for our study.  
In contrast to frames and advertisements, automatic page reloads 
involve pages that have originally been explicitly requested by the 
user. Some sites use this technique to update the page contents, 
e.g. to refresh the headlines of a new portal page. We decided to 
exclude these requests, as they were not user actions, only few 
sites use this technique and it biased the stay times of some users 
significantly. 
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2. CONCLUSION 
As became clear during the first analyses of the comprehensive 
datasets we had gathered, data cleaning and confirmation of user-
initiated events were crucial to be able to relate recorded events to 
user actions. Previous studies did not make use of similar data 
consolidation methods, probably because the amount of such 
‘noise’ was lower in the past: in 1995, advertisements were still 
hardly known on the Web, and Bruce McKenzie [3] told us that 
even in 2000 the effect of such requests could be neglected. Fur-
thermore, iFrames were first introduced in MS Internet Explorer 3 
(1996), and HTML 4.0 (first released Dec. 1997), but it took 
several years before they became popular, as the Netscape Navi-
gator 4 (used in McKenzie’s study [3]) did not support them. 
Using the techniques presented, we were able to confirm 137,272 
user-initiated navigation actions of our participants. They visited 
65,643 distinct URIs and 11,928 different domains. The personal 
Web usage varied widely in browsing style and activity: the par-
ticipants visited 19.5 to 204.8 pages per active day (every day in 
which at least one event was logged). A first analysis of the data 
is presented in [9]. 
Still, even after the data cleaning process, frames continued to be 
a nuisance for the interpretation of navigation actions: clicks on 
hyperlinks in one frame can lead to actions in one or several other 
frames. This makes it hard to define what exactly a page revisit is 
and when or how they occur. 
The effects of and the necessity for data cleaning seem to be very 
dependent on the technical implementation of Web sites visited 
during a study. From our experience we can recommend to log all 
events (including possible artifacts), containing exact time 
stamps, URIs, and window and frame names. Instead of inte-
grating data cleaning methods in the logging environment, the 
data should be filtered after finishing the study as many problems 
and effects can hardly be foreseen. 
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